

HIERARCHICAL SELF ORGANIZING MAP BASED IDS ON KDD BENCHMARK

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Abstract

In this work, an architecture consisting entirely Self-Organizing Feature Maps is developed for network based intrusion detection. The principle interest is to analyze just how far such an approach can be taken in practice. To do so, the KDD benchmark dataset from the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition is employed. In this work, no content based feature is utilized. Experiments are performed on two-level and three-level hierarchies, training set biases and the contribution of features to intrusion detection. Results show that a hierarchical SOM intrusion detection system is as good as the other learning based approaches that use content based features.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Along with its numerous benefits, the Internet also created numerous ways to compromise the security and stability of the systems connected to it. In 2002, 82094 incidents were reported to CERT/CC© while in 1999, there were 9859 reported incidents [10]. Fortunately, policies and tools are being developed to provide increasingly efficient defense mechanisms. Static defense mechanisms, which are analogous to the fences around the premises, can provide a reasonable level of security. They are intended to prevent attacks from happening. Keeping software such as operating systems up-to-date and deploying firewalls at entry points are examples of static defense solutions. Frequent software updates can prevent the exploitation of security holes. Firewalls are crucial to improve the defense at the entry level, however they are intended for access control rather than catching attackers.

No system is totally foolproof. Attackers are always one step ahead in finding security holes in current systems. Therefore dynamic defense mechanisms such as intrusion detection systems should be combined with static defense mechanisms. When an attack is taking place, it manifests itself in host audit data and/or in network traffic [11]. The purpose of the intrusion detection system (IDS) is to act like a burglar alarm, which monitors the network and the connected systems to find evidence of intrusion. Intrusion detection systems complement static defense mechanisms by double-checking firewalls for any configuration

errors, and then catching the attacks that firewalls let in or never see (i.e. insider attacks). Although they are not flawless, current intrusion detection systems are an essential part of the formulation of an entire defense policy.

Different detection mechanisms can be employed to search for the evidence of intrusions. Two major categories exist for detection mechanisms: misuse and anomaly detection. Misuse detection systems use *a priori* knowledge on attacks to look for attack traces. In other words, they detect intrusions by knowing what the misuse is [27]. Signature (rule) based systems are the most common examples of the misuse detection systems. In signature based detection, attack signatures are sought in the monitored resource. Signature based systems, by definition, are very accurate on known attacks which are included in their signature database. Moreover, since signatures are associated with specific misuse behavior, it is easy to determine the attack type. However, their detection capabilities are limited to those within signature database. As the new attacks are discovered, a signature database requires continuous updating to include the new attack signatures.

Anomaly systems adopt the opposite approach, which is, to know what is normal, and then find the deviations from the normal behavior. These deviations are considered as anomalies or possible intrusions. Anomaly detection systems rely on knowledge of normal behavior to detect any attacks. Thus attacks, including new ones are detected as long as the attack behavior deviates sufficiently from the normal behavior. However, if the attack is similar to the normal behavior, it may not be detected. Moreover, it is difficult to associate deviations with specific attacks. As the users change their behavior, normal behavior should be re-defined.

According to the resources they monitor, intrusion detection systems are divided into two categories. Host based intrusion detection systems monitor host resources for intrusion traces whereas network based intrusion detection systems try to find intrusion signs in the network data. The current trend in intrusion detection is to combine both host based and network based information to develop hybrid systems and therefore not rely on only one methodology.

A host based intrusion detection system monitors resources such as system logs, file systems, processor and disk resources. Example signs of intrusion on host resources are critical file modifications, segmentation fault errors recorded in logs, crashed services or extensive usage of the processors. An advantage of host based intrusion detection over network based intrusion detection is it can detect attacks, which are transmitted in an encrypted form over the network.

Network based intrusion detection systems inspect the packets passing through the network for intrusions signs. The amount of data passing through the network stream is extensive, therefore network based intrusion systems can be deployed on various locations of the network rather than on a global point from which all network traffic can be inspected. Depending on the amount of monitored data, a network based intrusion detection system can inspect only packet headers as well as the whole packet including the content. When deploying content-based attacks (e.g. a malicious URL to crash a buggy web server), intruders can evade intrusion detection systems by fragmenting the content into smaller packets. This causes intrusion detection systems to see one piece of the content at a time. Thus, network based intrusion detections systems, which perform content inspection, need to assemble the received packets and maintain state information of the open connections.

Intrusion detection systems have three common problems: speed, accuracy and adaptability. The speed problem arises from the extensive amount of data that intrusion detection systems need to monitor in order to perceive the entire situation. Detection relies on finding evidence of attacks in monitored data and responding in a timely fashion. Therefore collecting sufficient and reliable data without introducing overheads is an important issue [27]. In today's network technology where gigabit Ethernet is becoming more affordable, existing systems face significant challenges merely to maintain pace with current data streams. In the case of signature-based systems, signature databases are optimized for fast signature search. Distributing the intrusion detection process among different nodes in the network will also reduce the amount of monitored data seen by any sensor, where such a scheme is a necessity in switched network environments.

When measuring the performance of intrusion detection systems, the detection and false positive rates are used to summarize different characteristics of classification accuracy. In particular; false positives can be defined as the alarms that are raised from the legitimate activity. False negatives are the attacks, which are not detected by the system. An intrusion detection system gets more accurate as it detects more attacks and raises fewer false alarms. In today's intrusion detection systems, human input is essential to maintain the accuracy of the system. In case of signature based systems, as new attacks are discovered, security experts examine the attacks to create corresponding detection signatures. In the case of anomaly systems, experts are needed to define the normal behavior. This also brings us to the adaptability problem. The capability of the current intrusion detection systems for adaptation is very limited. This makes them inefficient in detecting new or unknown attacks or adapting to changing environments (i.e. human intervention is always required).

Incorporation of learning algorithms provide a potential solution for the adaptation and accuracy issues of the intrusion detection problem [3, 19, 1, 15, 42, 12, 33]. Specifically statistical and/or mathematical models are used to discover patterns in the input data. In the case of intrusion detection, learning means discovering patterns of normal behavior or attacks. Learning algorithms have a training phase where they mathematically 'learn' the patterns in the input dataset. The input dataset is also called the training set which should contain sufficient and representative instances of the patterns being discovered. A dataset instance is composed of features, which describe the dataset instance. Learned patterns can be used to make predictions on a new dataset instance based on its diversity from normal patterns or its similarity to known attack patterns or a combination of both. According to the learning method employed learning algorithms are typically supervised or unsupervised. In supervised learning, the learning algorithm is presented a set of classified (or labeled) instances and is expected to identify a way of predicting the new unclassified instances. On the other hand, unsupervised learning involves searching for associations between the features without making use of classes or labels [20]. In this work, Self Organizing Maps, which is an unsupervised learning algorithm, is used to build a hierarchy for intrusion detection. In network based intrusion detection, amount of the data monitored is extensive.

Therefore, we adopt a divide and conquer approach and develop a multi level Self Organizing Map hierarchy in which the amount of monitored data is reduced on higher levels without any performance degradation. We are interested in establishing how far a hierarchy of Self Organizing Maps can be taken, whilst only utilizing minimum *a priori* information. Firstly, the work only uses the six basic features derived from individual TCP connections where the original dataset consists of 41 features per connection. Secondly, in order to provide for the representation of sequence, feature integration and resolution, three SOM "levels" are employed, where each level has a specific structure and purpose. In first level, Six Self-Organizing Feature Maps (SOM) are built, one for each input feature and designed to express sequence. The second level of the hierarchy integrates the information from each first level - feature specific - SOM. A third layer is selectively built for better resolution of second layer neurons that respond to both attack and normal connections. Neurons in the second and third layers are therefore labeled using the training set, but the training process itself is entirely unsupervised.

The organization of the thesis is as follows; traditional and learning based approaches to intrusion detection are discussed in Chapter 2. Moreover, all learning systems discussed utilize KDD competition dataset which is derived from DARPA dataset. We therefore benchmark several signature based intrusion detection systems on a DARPA dataset for the purpose of comparison, where signature based systems represent the current commercial norm [14]. Chapter 3 provides the motivation for the proposed hierarchy of Self Organizing Maps for intrusion detection and Chapter 4 details the corresponding learning algorithms. Several experiments were performed on the proposed hierarchy and the results will be discussed in Chapter 5 [15]. Chapter 6 provides the conclusion remarks and future directions for this work. The details of the dataset employed in this work are provided in Appendix A. In addition, Appendix B provides the detailed performance results of the proposed hierarchy. Visualizations of the resulting SOMs from different experiments are shown in Appendix C and D.

Chapter 2

Literature Survey

Both learning based and signature based intrusion detection systems have their own advantages and disadvantages. For better intrusion detection, signature based systems can be combined with learning systems to minimize the shortcomings of each other. In addition, designers intrusion detection systems should examine the disadvantages of the both and try to minimize them in new systems. Selected learning approaches, which employ exactly the same dataset as this work, will be discussed in Section 2.1. Signature based intrusion detection systems are discussed with three of the most commonly used intrusion detection systems, Section 2.2.

2.1 Learning System Approaches

As indicated before, most of the current intrusion detection systems are based on a signature-based approach and need frequent signature updates. Learning algorithms have generalization capabilities that have the potential to capture normal and intrusion behavior from data. Thus, the generic objective is to detect novel attacks by determining deviations from the normal behavior or finding similarities with known intrusions. To assess different learning

approaches, an intrusion detection dataset is provided within The International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition in 1999 [17]. This benchmark provides the *only* labeled dataset for comparing IDS systems, which we are aware of. The dataset contains 5,000,000 network connection records. The training portion of the dataset contains 494,021 connections of which 20% are normal. Each connection record contains 41 independent fields and a label (normal or type of attack). Each attack belongs to one of the four attack categories: user to root, remote to local, probe, and denial of service. Details of the KDD 99 dataset will be discussed later in Section 3.1.2.

The competitors of KDD 99 were asked to predict the class of each connection in a test set containing 311,029 connection records. In total, 24 competitors submitted their results and three winners were selected. This dataset is still being used by researches working on learning based intrusion detection systems [3, 19, 1, 15, 42, 12, 33]. The winners of the KDD 99 classifier competition and other selected learning approaches, which make use of KDD 99 dataset, will be discussed in the following with performance comparisons in Tables 2.3 and 2.4. We begin, however by discussing a data mining approach, where this is central in the construction of the connection based features utilized by the KDD 99 dataset.

A Data Mining Framework for IDS

Attack behavior naturally leaves traces in audit data [11]. A critical decision of the intrusion detection design is to carefully select the raw audit source, which contains attack traces. Moreover raw audit data might require pre-processing, which involves summarizing the raw audit data to higher-level events such as network connection or host session. This work [42] aims to formulate a framework for intrusion detection system design. "The central idea is to utilize auditing programs to extract an extensive set of features that describe each network connection or host session, and apply data mining programs to learn rules that accurately capture the behavior of intrusions and normal activities." [42]

For summarization purposes, the Bro [41] network analyzer is deployed to extract features from raw recorded network traffic (tcpdump) data in DARPA 98 dataset. As a result, tcpdump data is summarized to network connections where each connection has a set of

intrinsic attributes (hereafter called intrinsic features). Content of the telnet sessions were also examined and summarized to user command records where each record contains the timestamp (am, pm, night), host name, command name and the set of arguments. In addition to telnet sessions, contents of other TCP connections (e.g. ftp, smtp, etc.) were inspected. As a result, content based features such as the number of failed logins, whether the login user is root or not, whether critical files (e.g. /etc/passwd) were accessed or not are derived. Three different types of data mining algorithms were applied to detect intrusions and to construct new features from the existing ones. Types of data mining algorithms employed are classification, link analysis and sequence analysis.

Classification involves applying classifier algorithms on collected instances of normal and attack behavior to predict the new unseen audit data. A Decision tree, employed in the three winning approaches, is an example of such a classifier. In [42], for classification, RIPPER was used. RIPPER is a rule learner, which generates rules from the input data to classify unseen data. When RIPPER was applied to content based telnet data, the rules derived for password guessing and buffer overflow attacks are as follows:

If Failed Logins > 6 then it is a guess password attack.

If (Hot indicator =3) and (compromised conditions =2) and
(root shell is obtained) then it is a buffer overflow attack.

Link Analysis "determines the relations between the fields in the database records" [42]. For instance, a user might associate "emacs" command with "C" files. Association rules approach is used for link analysis. This approach mines the input data to derive multi feature correlations. For example the resulting association rule for normal behavior of a secretary derived from the content-based telnet data is as follows:

(Command is vi) and (Time is morning) and (Hostname is Pascal)
and (argument is tex)

Sequence analysis involves discovering which events are actually related. Sequence analysis plays an important role in determining temporal features. In addition to the above intrinsic and content-based features explained before, sequence analysis is applied to intrinsic features of the connection records to derive temporal and statistical features. Examples of the temporal features are "number of connections that to same destination host in the past 2 seconds" and "number of requests to the same service in the past 2 seconds". These two features cover the attacks targeted to same host or to same service on all hosts.

The work [42] applied data mining for both misuse detection and anomaly detection. In the case of misuse detection, a combination of features from the three categories was used to detect different intrusions. To this end three detection models were formed. In the "traffic" model, only intrinsic features were used. This means host based and content based awareness were not implemented. In host-based "traffic" model, temporal features were used with intrinsic features. In "content" model, content-based features were used with intrinsic features. Meta-learning was then used as the classifier for each of the three models. The predictions of the three models were combined with the real data label. The RIPPER classifier was then applied to learn rules that combine evidence from all three models. The resulting classifier used content-based rules to detect content-based attacks such as user-to-root and remote-to-local. Intrinsic features and host-based features were used to detect denial of service and probe attacks, which have distinct temporal features. Table 2.1 details the rule counts for each meta-classifier. For the traffic model, 9 additional temporal and statistical features were used in RIPPER rules. Similarly for the host-based model, 5 additional temporal and statistical features were used in RIPPER rules. This also shows that new temporal and statistical features contribute to rule construction. Overall performance of the system on old (encountered in training set) attacks was 80.2% and, on new attacks (not encountered in training set), overall performance was 37.7%.

A user anomaly detection system was also developed from the command records. Six user (namely, 1 system admin, 2 programmers, 1 secretary and 2 managers) profiles were defined. User command records were then mined to compare with the defined user profile

	# features in records	# of rules	# features in rules
Content-Based	22	55	11
Traffic	20	26	4+9
Host-Based	14	8	1+5

Table 2.1: Complexity data of the three detection models

patterns and a similarity score calculated [42]. For example, if the user executed n commands and m out of n comments match with the profile of the user, then the similarity score is (m/n) . Lower similarity scores correspond to anomalous behavior. Resulting anomaly system detected some anomalies such as: "secretary logs in at night", "system admin becomes the programmer", and "manager becomes the system admin".

Thus, pre-processing of the raw data is very important and should not be overlooked. The framework explained in this work is a comprehensive resource on constructing features, which can be used in learning based intrusion detection system designs. Authors of [42] participated in pre-processing of the DARPA 98 network data to form the KDD 99 network connection data on which the following systems are based.

1st Winner of the KDD 99 IDS competition

The winning approach [3] is a decision tree based intrusion detection system. Decision tree based learning utilize a divide-and-conquer approach to determine which attribute of the data best separates the classes. Every node in the decision tree tests a particular attribute, and in this way determine which child node will be tested next. Dataset instances are fed to the decision tree from the root node. When a leaf node is reached, the data instance is classified with the label of the leaf [20].

Initially, the author of [3] experimented on C5 (decision trees, rules, boosted trees), RIPPER, naive bayes, nearest neighbor and some neural network approaches. RIPPER, neural networks and nearest neighbor algorithms were more computationally intensive than the others and therefore they were not selected as the learning algorithm. Decision trees performed better than the naive bayes on initial experiments; therefore decision trees (namely C5) were selected as the learning algorithm.

In this approach, an ensemble of 50x10 C5 decision trees was used as the predictor. The constructed ensemble can be summarized as "cost-sensitive bagged boosting" [3]. Duplicate dataset instances were removed *a priori*, which also changed the distribution of the dataset. Training is performed by first partitioning the original dataset of around 5 million instances into 50 subsets. However, the sampling procedure for subset formulation was biased. A sample always included all rare user-to-root, remote-to-local attack class instances and some of the remaining dominant normal, denial of service, probe class instances. For each of the 50 subsets, an ensemble of 10 decision trees was built by using C5's error-cost and boosting options. Accuracy results of this work for different categories are detailed in Table 2.2.

Category	Accuracy
Normal	99.50%
Probe	83.30%
Denial of Service	97.10%
User to Root	13.20%
Remote to Local	8.40%

Table 2.2: Accuracy of the KDD 99 winner on different categories

2nd Winner of the KDD 99 IDS competition

The second placed winner [19] applied a data-mining tool called Kernel Miner. Kernel Miner divides the global model into inter-related and inter-consistent sub models. As a result, Kernel Miner constructs the set of locally optimal decision trees from which it selects the optimal subset of trees used for predicting classes. In this approach, decision trees were built for different categories as well as different attack types. The resulting decision tree group contained 218 decision trees for categories and 537 decision trees for specific attack types. Figure 2.1 shows the decision tree built for the "smurf" denial of service attack.

In case of the "smurf" tree, as we take the "yes" branch on every node, more "smurf" instances are covered and more other instances are left out. The last leaf on the bottom, which is reached by the "yes" branch, covers all the "smurf" instances in the dataset. Decision trees can also be used to construct rules for specific attacks. The "smurf" decision tree,




Figure 2.1: Decision tree for smurf attack [19]

which covers all "smurf" attacks, can be converted to a rule:

If (Source Bytes is between 519 and 1032) and (service type is ecr_i) then the connection is a smurf attack.

3rd Winner of the KDD 99 IDS competition

The third placed approach was based on voting decision trees using "pipes" in the potential space [1]. Learning is achieved in two stages. In the first stage 13 decision trees were built based on a subset of training data. The objective of the first stage was to separate normal connections from the attacks. The key idea of the second stage was denoted "one against the rest" where one class was separated from others using 5 decision trees. Each connection in the dataset was assigned a vector of proximity to the five categories (including normal). This representation of the connection is called the potential space whereas the multidimensional interval on proximity vectors is called a "pipe"[1]. Prediction was then

performed on potential space. In this approach, 10% of the dataset was employed for training. Training set is randomly divided into three parts: 25% for tree generation. 25% for tree tuning and the remaining 50% for estimating tree quality. The performance results of the third winner were not available in their short paper [1]. However [6] indicates that all the three winners performed close to each other. Table 2.3 summarizes the performance of the winners in terms of percentage of false alarms and attack detection on test set.

	False Alarm	Detection
1st Winner	0.50%	91%
2nd Winner	0.58%	91.30%

Table 2.3: Performance summary of the KDD 99 winners.

Anomaly Detection with unlabeled data

Most of the current intrusion detection systems and supervised learning algorithms require labeled data to determine the behavior of attacks. Labeling involves marking each dataset instance as an attack or normal, where this requires extensive domain knowledge over extensive periods of time. The framework proposed in [12] utilizes the data in an unlabeled format to develop anomaly systems. An unsupervised anomaly system approach was based on two basic assumptions. First, the ratio of attack instances should be significantly less than the ratio of normal instances (e.g. 1% to 99%). Second, anomalous behavior should be separable from normal behavior.

This framework first maps the audit stream data to a feature space. "The choice of feature space is application specific. Therefore performance greatly depends on the ability of the feature space to capture information relevant to the application." [12] Anomalous behavior is separated from the normal behavior in the feature space where the main property of a feature space is a dot product operation, defined between data sample and each candidate feature. To this end, a data-dependent normalized feature mapping was applied to the KDD 99 network data and an additional spectrum kernel map was applied to DARPA 99 system call trace data. Mathematical treatment of the feature mapping approaches is provided in [12]. After mapping the raw data to a feature space, outliers were detected by applying

three different learning algorithms, which examine the distances between the points in the feature space.

The first learning algorithm is a cluster based estimation algorithm. For each point, the number of points within a specified radius w of the selected point is calculated. Points in dense regions will have high-density values whereas outlier points have low-density. The algorithm works as follows.

1. Assign the first point as the first cluster
2. Sample another point
3. If the point is within the w radius of a cluster center, then add it to that cluster, otherwise create a new cluster
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until all points are processed

Resulting clusters were sorted based on their size. The points in the smaller clusters were labeled as an anomaly. The computational complexity of the algorithm was reported to be $O(cn)$ where c is the number of clusters and n is the number of points in the dataset.

K -Nearest neighbor algorithm was the second clustering algorithm employed by [12]. This classifies new instances based on the closest instance in the training set. In case of the k -nearest algorithm, the majority class of the closest k neighbors determines the class [20]. The variation of the algorithm used in [12] is that for each point, the sum of the distances between the point and its k nearest neighbors are calculated. A point in a dense region will be close to its neighbors, and therefore the corresponding sum will be small. The complexity of the k -nearest neighbor algorithm is $O(n^2)$, which is impractical for intrusion detection applications [12]. Therefore results from the first cluster-based estimation were used to speed up the clustering process. However the amount of speedup is not reported in the paper [12].

The third algorithm employed by [12] is the support vector machine (SVM) method, where this is used to estimate the region where most of the points are located. Basic SVM maps the feature space into a second feature space where linear separation between two classes becomes possible. The objective of the SVM algorithm is to find a hyper plane (also called decision surface) to separate classes by maximizing the distance between them. Standard SVM is a supervised learning algorithm. However this work [12] employed an unsupervised variation of the SVM, which attempts to separate the entire training set from the origin. This is achieved "by solving a quadratic program that penalizes any points not separated from the origin while simultaneously trying to maximize the hyper plane from the origin" [12]. Points that are on the same side of the hyper plane with the origin are labeled as normal and the points that are on the other side are labeled as anomaly.

Authors used KDD 99 data to create a dataset, which contains 1 to 1.5% attacks and 98.5 to 99% normal traffic. System call data is taken from the DARPA 99 dataset, which includes the data collected by the basic security module of a Solaris machine in the DARPA 99 network. Among all system calls in three weeks of data, 'eject' and 'ps' system calls were examined. For different datasets, different parameters were used. For example in the case of a cluster-based estimation algorithm, radius is selected as 40 for network data, 5 for 'eject' system call traces and 10 for 'ps' traces. For k -nearest neighbor algorithm, k is selected as 10,000 for network data, 2 for 'eject' system calls and 15 for 'ps' system calls. Selected performance results of the algorithms on KDD 99 data where detection rate is maximum are detailed in Table 2.4. The results listed in Table 2.4 will also be used to compare our system with other learning algorithm based approaches.

Algorithm	False Alarm	Detection
Cluster Based	93%	10%
K-Nearest Neighbor	91%	8%
SVM	98%	10%

Table 2.4: Performance of the three learning algorithms on KDD 99 data

This approach proposes a solution to use with any data without first labeling them. Although it eliminates the need for labels, collecting and isolating normal behavior may not

be easy on real world systems. Moreover, as indicated above, each dataset has a different set of learning parameters that are determined by using *a priori* knowledge.

Classifying rare classes

As Table 2.2 shows; even the first placed KDD competition approach suffers from low detection rates of rare (e.g. r2l) attacks. The work of [33] directly addresses the problem of detecting rare deviations. For example password guessing does not require many connections therefore its occurrence is rare. The classifier proposed by [33] aims to solve the problem of insignificant coverage rules created by some classifiers such as RIPPER and C4.5. These small coverage rules result from the tight accuracy constraints of the current classifiers. Thus, [33] has a two-phase classification, which relaxes accuracy constraints. The key point of the work is it conquers the objectives of high detection rate and low false alarm rates separately. Rules are generated in two phases.

In the first phase, P-rules are generated which predict the presence of the target class. P rules are added as long as the contribution of the rule (in terms of both rule coverage and accuracy) is within pre-defined limits. P-rules can cover some dataset instances, which do not belong to the target class. These instances introduce false alarms. In the second phase, N-rules are generated which predict the absence of the target class. Significance of the N-rules is they remove the false alarm effect of the P-rules. For prediction (whether attack or not), P-rules and N-rules are sorted according to their significance (i.e. the order they are generated). P-rules are then applied to the new unseen instance. If no P-rules cover the instance then the prediction is false. If one or more P-rules cover the instance then the first P-rule is accepted. After which, N-rules are applied to the instance. The first N-rule that applies is selected. If a P-rule covers the instance and no N-rules apply then the prediction is true. However [33] aims to predict classes with a probabilistic score rather than a true/false prediction. The motivation for probabilistic prediction is that a given N-rule might be effective on removing the false alarm effect of a specific set of P-rules. Therefore, each P-rule N-rule combination has a different probability of prediction. If the probability is greater than 0.5, prediction is considered 'true'.

The algorithm has two control parameters. The first one defines the minimum class coverage in P-Phase and the second is used to control the rule growth in N-Phase. In [33], among other datasets, KDD 99 network data was also used as a rare class source. Resulting predictor can detect user-to-root attacks with up to 10.4% whereas the detection rate of the winner for this category is 8.4%. Moreover, probe attacks, which can be considered as a minority in KDD 99 dataset, can be detected up to 87.5% whereas the detection rate of the winner in the original KDD competition was 83.3% for this category.

Neural Network based approaches

In [7], Self-Organizing Map was combined with Resilient Propagation Neural Network (RPROP) for intrusion detection. SOM was used for clustering and visualization whereas RPROP was used to classify normal patterns and intrusions. Unlike KDD 99 Intrusion detection dataset, the dataset employed in [7] is not a benchmarking dataset. It consisted of normal connections and three specific attacks (namely, a SYN flood attack called neptune, a port scan attack called portsweep and a probe called satan. Data patterns containing normal connections and three attack classes were divided into eight subsets and a SOM was trained with each subset. Neuron weights from the eight resulting SOMs were then fed to the three-layer PRPROP neural network where classification takes place at the third (highest) level. Since the dataset is not a benchmarking dataset, it is impossible to compare the results with other approaches.

In [21], a modified version of Cerebellar Model Articulation Controller (CMAC) neural network [24] was employed. The CMAC neural network is a three layer feed forward form of a neural network, which produces input-output mappings. One of the key advantages of CMAC neural network is it learns new patterns without complete re-training. The system was presented ping flood attack after being trained with normal behavior. When the system is tested on ping flood attack, the high detection rate (98%) showed that the system is able to learn new behavior (in this case an attack behavior). Moreover, when the system is tested with new (UDP storm) attack, it also achieved high detection rate for this attack (98%).

Another neural network based approach involves a Multi Level Perceptron architecture

that consisted of four layers [8]. The training algorithm involved using a back propagation algorithm. Training and test data was collected from RealSecure network monitor from Internet Security Systems therefore it is not a benchmarking dataset. The training data contained attacks therefore the resulting system is a misuse detection system. Although without performance details, system was reported to detect attacks in the test data, which also contained normal connections [8].

Self-Organizing Map based approaches

Although different packet headers contain different amount of information, network traffic is summarized into connections consisting of 41 features in KDD 99 dataset. The general idea of [4] was to employ different Self-Organizing Maps for different protocols to handle the heterogeneous traffic. Protocols can be from any OSI layer such as IP from the third OSI layer or TCP from the fourth OSI layer. In this approach a SOM was trained with the normal behavior of a protocol, which therefore specializes on that protocol. SOMs were arranged according to their location in OSI layers. Anomalous behavior was detected by calculating the distance of the input data to neurons of the SOM. Before each SOM, an analyzer stack was employed to summarize traffic of each protocol individually and derive the input to the SOM. To this end, three layers were employed in [4].

At the first layer, the IP stack SOM examined all IP traffic. Then, two specialist SOMs (namely TCP and UDP) were employed to examine the traffic on the second layer. Similarly, based on the requested service, different SOMs were employed in the third layer such as HTTP, DNS, SMTP or Telnet. This way, the amount of data examined by SOMs was reduced in higher layers. In [4], DNS traffic was used to demonstrate the capabilities of the architecture. The architecture was trained on 30 DNS packets, which -when compared with approaches employing KDD 99 dataset - was a very small dataset. For test purposes a DNS bind exploit was generated. It was observed that packets involving the exploit were distant from the neurons of the corresponding SOM whereas the packets having normal DNS behavior were closer.

Another SOM based system [5] employed a similar approach of specializing a SOM for

each service such as FTP, HTTP, and Telnet. Detection was based on calculating a quantization error, which could be considered as a distortion measure. When an input data is presented to the service specific SOM, if its quantization error is higher than a pre-determined threshold, the connection is labeled as attack.

In [5], raw traffic from DARPA 99 intrusion detection dataset was summarized into connection records by using a network analyzer called Real-time TCPTrace. This analyzer produces connection summary information at the connection initiation, connection termination and every 60 seconds. Each connection record consisted of six features, which are number of requests (to destination) per second, average size of the requests, average size of the responses (from destination), sum of idle time of destination waiting a request, sum of idle time of source waiting a response and number of connections.

Authors of [5] employed a SOM for SMTP service (TCP port 25) and another SOM for FTP service (TCP port 21). Each SOM was trained with the normal connections of the service data from week 1. The resulting SOMs were tested on two individual attacks from week 4. First selected attack was the mailbomb denial of service attack, which involves sending many packets to the mail server of the victim. The second attack was guessftp attack in which an attacker tries to guess the password of an account using ftp service. Without details, system is claimed to detect both attack types with high detection rates [5].

Another SOM based approach [28] focused on the visualization capabilities of the SOM to provide network administrators a comprehensible visualization of the events taking place. This will allow administrators to search for the relationships in the data. The general idea behind the visualization was to place similar events together while events with unrelated patterns are placed apart. To this end, network intrusion dataset from Information Exploration Shootout Project [13] is employed for training. The dataset contains eight features for each network event. In terms of the system performance, some attacks in the dataset were claimed to be detected by observing their placement on the visualization.

The UNIX host based intrusion detection system proposed in [18] consisted of data collection component, a user behavior visualization component and anomaly detection component. Self-Organizing Maps were employed for behavior visualization and anomaly detection. Each user behavior on a UNIX host was characterized with 16 features. The general idea behind [18] was to employ a SOM to approximate the normal behavior and detect anomalies by finding their deviations, which was calculated with an anomaly P-Value measure. Anomaly P-Value was a measure of the degree of anomaly and it is calculated from the winning neurons and their distances to the input data. The dataset used in this work is the user behavior gathered from a UNIX host. A key property of this work was adaptability where training is continuous. System carries on learning as it works on the host. One effect of continuous learning is the system may also learn to adapt to intrusions. In anomaly systems, designers should ensure that learning is done on normal behavior. Although there is no detailed performance evaluation, some anomalies are examined [18].

The authors of [25] used clustering and visualization capabilities of SOM for intrusion detection. The hypothesis of this work was "normal behavior would be clustered around one or more cluster centers and any irregular patterns representing abnormal and possibly suspicious behavior would be clustered outside the normal clustering." [25] The authors used the packets that they captured from their network as the dataset. For training, protocol type, source and destination IP features were selected from the packets. Selected features were fed to SOM in 50 packet chunks. Rather than using timestamps, 10 successive values of the same feature were used for time representation. To demonstrate the performance of the system, trained SOM was subjected to denial of service attacks. It is observed that the winning neurons for those attacks were scattered outside the normal cluster.

2.2 Signature Based Intrusion Detection

Current intrusion detection systems that exist in the market are mainly signature based misuse detection systems. In this traditional approach, the detection process involves searching

known attack signatures on network or system resources. One of the main drawbacks of such systems is they can only detect known attacks which are included in their signature database. An example of a signature database is an array of link lists. This structure enables a search to be performed on only applicable test conditions, thus minimizing the computational needs.

2.2.1 Examples Signature Based Systems

In this section, Snort and Pakemon - two open source network based intrusion detection systems - and the Cisco IOS firewall, which provides a basic intrusion detection component will be introduced as the signature based intrusion detection examples. Details of these systems are as follows:

Snort IDS: Snort is one of the best-known lightweight IDSs, which focuses on performance, flexibility and simplicity. It is an open-source intrusion detection system that is now in quite widespread use [32]. It can detect various attacks and probes including instances of buffer overflows, stealth port scans, common gateway interface attacks, and service message block system probes. Hence, it is an example of active intrusion detection systems that detects possible intrusions or access violations while they are occurring [9]. Later versions of Snort provide IP de-fragmentation and TCP assembly to further the detection of attacks, or be it at the expense of having to view the whole attack data. Snort is lighter than commercial IDSs but it provides more features than any other IDS evaluated in this study. Although not as straightforward as the Pakemon system, flexible rule writing is supported in Snort.

Pakemon IDS: "Pakemon has been developed to share IDS components based on the open source model" [26]. Pakemon is an open source experimental IDS, which aims to detect evasion methods such as fragmentation, disorder, duplication, overlap, insertion, and de-synchronization at the IP or TCP layer. Intrusion detection systems that perform monitoring at the packet level will not be able to see the intrusion data in the same way that final

destination of a packet experiences. Hence, Pakemon processes capture packets like a Linux node by reassembling IP packets and reconstructing the TCP streams. This was an important feature to provide especially in the light of earlier versions of Snort, which lacked such a facility. Pakemons's signature structure is simpler than other IDS (such as Snort), where this simplicity is both strength, and weakness. That is to say, it takes time for IDS organizations to release new signature files. Meanwhile, as the signatures of new attacks are revealed, it is much easier to add them to the lightweight IDS signature databases such as Pakemon [26, 32].

Cisco IOS Firewall: Cisco IOS provides a cost effective way to deploy a firewall with intrusion detection capabilities. In addition to the features, Cisco IOS Firewall has 59 built-in, static signatures to detect common attacks and misuse attempts. IDS process on the firewall inspects packet headers for intrusion detection by using those 59 signatures. In some cases routers may examine the whole packet and maintain the state information for the connection. Signatures fall into two categories: compound and atomic. There is no traffic dependent memory requirement for atomic signatures because they do not involve connection state. For compound signatures memory is allocated to inspect the state of the connection [39]. Upon attack detection, the firewall can be configured to log the incident, drop the packet or reset the connection. The purpose of the intrusion detection component - on which we focused in this evaluation - is to detect basic attacks on firewall without consuming resources, which should be used for routing, and forward the filtered traffic to the IDS in order to be inspected in more detail.

To evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the signature based intrusion detection systems, we benchmarked these three systems on the DARPA dataset to put them in the same context with the learning based systems detailed in Section 2.1.

2.2.2 Benchmarking Test Set-up and Procedures

The test set up of this work consists of the following components: DARPA 1999 data set, traffic re-player and three systems under evaluation.

Dataset Characteristics

For benchmarking purposes use is made of the DARPA 1999 Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set [30]. This represents Tcpdump and audit data generated over five weeks of simulated network traffic in a hypothetical military local area network (LAN). This work concentrates on the traffic data collected by sniffers on week-4. The reason we chose week-4 is that the first three weeks of the data set was designed for training the data driven learning systems in the original competition, hence not applicable to this work (signature based systems have no learning phase), whereas weeks 4 and 5 represented the test data. In this case for, reasons of expediency, we concentrate on the 2.5GB of data present in week 4 data set (week 5 is even larger and beyond capabilities of the computing resources available).

The data used for testing (week 4) therefore either represented a normal connection or one of the 55 different attack types [29]. There are 80 attacks in week-4 data set, where all attacks fell into one of the five following categories:

- *Denial of Service*: Attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service.
- *Remote to Local*: Attacker does not have an account on the victim machine, hence tries to gain local access.
- *User to Root*: Attacker has local access to the victim machine and tries to gain super-user privileges.
- *Probe*: Attacker tries to gather information on the target host.
- *Data*: Attacker performs some action, which is prohibited by the security policy.




Figure 2.2: Network diagram of the benchmarking environment

Test Environment

In order to evaluate the selected systems based on the 1999 DARPA data set, an environment was necessary where test data could be re-run from the 4th week for the 3 target systems. To this end, the TCPReplay utility [31] provided by SourceForge.net is used to replay packets to a live network that were previously captured with the tcpdump program. In effect, TCPReplay attempts to match the timing of the original traffic, optionally speeding it up or slowing it down [31]. In addition, TCPReplay supports multiple network interfaces allowing the injection of replayed packets into different points on a network based on the source address [31].

The intrusion detection benchmarking environment actually utilized here is shown in Figure 2.2. This consists of one Pentium 200 machine, two Pentium 133 machines all with 32 MB memory and a Cisco 3600 router with IOS version 12. The Cisco router is configured to log alerts to the syslog service of the log machine. One of the Pentium 133 machine is designated as Intrusion Detection (ID) server (on which Pakemon and Snort runs and listens the Ethernet in promiscuous mode) and the other is designated as the log machine, which logs the alerts Cisco IOS sends. The Pentium 200 machine is designated to TCPReplay, where this is responsible for replaying the recorded traffic. Router is configured to inspect the packets for intrusions and then to let them in to be inspected by the intrusion detection server.

Linux Mandrake 8.1 is installed on all machines as the operating system including all the necessary libraries (such as libpcap, libnet, libnids etc.). It should be noted that Pakemon and Snort are used with their default configurations. Moreover, the latest (March 2002) signature files available are used for both intrusion detection systems. On the other hand, the data set is replayed with 1Mbps speed because of the hardware limitations of the ID server (Pakemon/Snort server, Figure 2.2). It took approximately 2 hours to replay one-day of traffic.

Evaluation Procedure

It should be noted that log or alert files of the systems evaluated contain different types of entries including different amounts of information about the events that occurred on the network. Each entry is a packet/message that contains information about an event from a specific IP address (destination IP and ports). However, an individual attack might contain more than one entry and many TCP sessions. Therefore, different scripts are developed in order to filter out the required information from different types of entries in the log files of Snort, Pakemon and Cisco IOS. We configured Pakemon to record everything in system log and then the packets to another file, whereas Snort is configured to record intrusion attempts in directories. Cisco IOS is configured to use the system log service of a Linux Machine. Thus, our reporting scripts run on these files for Snort, Pakemon and Cisco IOS.

Basically, reporting scripts extract the IP and port information from the log files, and compare them to the ones in the attack identification list, which holds the true attack information in the DARPA data set [29]. Thus, the systems are compared against the true attacks that occurred in the 4th week of the simulation, where there were 80 attack instances. The comparison of the attack identification list and the log file entries is performed based on source (attacker) and destination (victim) IP addresses and ports. Information about the source or destination is extracted from the IDS log files, whereas information about the attacker or victim is extracted from the attack identification list. In other words, we compare attacker information in the identification list with the source information in the log files and victim information in the identification list with destination information in the log files. However,

since most entries do not include all the required information (in the case of Pakemon, a global port-scan entry in a log file usually includes only the source IP), it becomes difficult to match the relevant fields. Therefore, four confidence rules (CR) are defined for determining the degree of match in order to detect different attacks, Table 2.5. A log entry - attack match is most confident if it is a CR1 match, whereas it is least confident if it is a CR4 match.

	CR1	CR2	CR3	CR4
Source and Attacker IP match	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Destination and Victim IP match	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Source and Attacker port match	Yes	No	No	No
Destination and Victim port match	Yes	Yes	No	No

Table 2.5: Summary of the confidence rules

2.2.3 Evaluation Results

As indicated in section 2.2.2, scripts match attacks with log entries. If there is a match, scripts output attack ID, attack name, attack category from attack identification list and match confidence level. Table 2.6 summarizes the detection rate of each system on different categories on the 4th week of traffic generated for DARPA 1999 evaluation.

	U2R	R2L	DoS	Probe	Data	Total
Snort	62.5%	48.6%	31.3%	26.7%	75.0%	43.8%
Pakemon	12.5%	45.9%	38.0%	13.3%	75.0%	36.2%
Cisco IOS	12.5%	18.9%	31.3%	26.7%	0%	21.3%
Total in Week 4	8	37	16	15	4	80

Table 2.6: Number of detected attack instances in different categories compared with their number of occurrences in 4th week

When the performances of these systems are compared based on different categories, we see that performance of Snort and Pakemon share similar detection counts over different attack categories. To actually determine which system performs better, two more parameters are taken into consideration: number of false alarms and total number of entries i.e.

the number of entries that it takes to be parsed by a network administrator to detect those attacks.




Figure 2.3: Log file analysis in terms of number of entries

Figure 2.3 shows the number of attack related entries in the corresponding log files and their percentage. The reason the number of entries is so high for both Snort and Pakemon is that both IDSs usually log attack entries more than once. This in return increases the size of the log files requiring analysis by network administrators. The occurrence of non-attack entries, i.e. false alarm rate, is very high in both of the intrusion detection systems. Thus, it is very costly to examine log entries of the two IDS. Although Cisco IOS detects fewer attacks, it has low false alarm rate and small log file size, which are the significant advantages over the two IDS.

	CR1	CR2	CR3	CR4
Snort	0	6	29	0
Pakemon	0	5	21	1
Cisco IOS	0	0	17	0

Table 2.7: Detection confidence rules for each system

As shown in Table 2.7, most of the attacks are detected with the third confidence rule. Cisco

IOS always detects with third confidence rule because it does not log port information whereas Pakemon and Snort do in some cases. Among the 59 signatures documented in Cisco IOS documentation [39], only 5 signatures are triggered by the test data. Distribution of the 5 signatures over attack related entries is shown in Table 2.8. Signature IDs and names are as follows:

- *1102 Impossible IP Packet*: This signature is triggered if the source and destination addresses are the same.
- *2000 ICMP Echo Reply*: This signature is triggered if the ICMP message is "echo reply".
- *2001 ICMP Host Unreachable*: This signature is triggered if the ICMP message is "Host Unreachable".
- *3042 TCP-FIN bit with no ACK in flags*: This signature is triggered if FIN bit is set but ACK is not set in a packet
- *3050 Half-open SYN attack*: This signature is triggered if a connection is improperly initiated to a well-known TCP port such as FTP, Telnet, HTTP or E-Mail.

	U2R	R2L	DoS	Probe	Data
Sig. 1102	0	0	1	0	0
Sig. 2000	0	0	4	2	0
Sig. 2001	3	14	0	19	0
Sig. 3042	0	0	0	1	0
Sig. 3050	1	16	3	4	0

Table 2.8: Distribution of triggered Cisco IOS signatures among attack related entries

The only instance of signature 1102 is at DoS category, which is expected because it is triggered by the land attack. Land is a denial of service attack, which involves packets with the same source and destination addresses. Signature 2001, which produced the majority of the attack related alerts, is triggered mostly by R2L and Probe. We believe this is natural

since ICMP messages can be used to probe a host or launch a remote attack. In Figure 2.4, each system is represented as a set, which contains detected attacks. The regions that intersect show the attacks detected by more than one system. Each element in the Figure 2.4 represents a detected attack with the format: Attack Name (Number of detected instances in that region / Total instances in Week 4) - Attack Category.




Figure 2.4: Analysis of detected attacks

Crash IIS (Day 2), Power Point Macro (Day 3 and 4), Mail Bomb (Day 3), SSH Trojan (Day 4 and 5), Netbus (Day 5) and Windows Security Hole (Day 5) attacks are detected by all three systems. To the total defense system formed by three systems, Snort contributes 13 (16.3%) attacks (upper left region), Pakemon contributes 3 (3.8%) attacks (upper right region) and Cisco IOS contributes 3 (3.8%) attacks. Mutually detected attacks are not counted in the net contribution because even if one system is taken out of the defense mechanism, remaining systems will still be able to detect them. By using Snort, Pakemon and Cisco IOS together, 56.3% attacks are detected whereas individual performances are

43.8%, 36.2%, and 21.3% for Snort, Pakemon and Cisco IOS respectively. Figure 2.5 visually summarizes the performance of each system individually and combined together (S: Snort, P: Pakemon, C: Cisco IOS).




Figure 2.5: Performance of the evaluated systems

2.3 Discussion

Advantages and disadvantages of the signature based and learning based approaches are emphasized in this section. While learning systems have generalization capabilities, building a learning based intrusion detection system is a huge knowledge engineering task. Pre-Processing which is applied before dataset is fed to the learning system is very important and poor pre-processing can significantly affect the performance of a learning system. Another issue is that some learning algorithms require *a priori* knowledge about the data that they will work on. This makes it difficult to deploy those learning systems on different datasets. Also, supervised learning algorithms such as classifiers need labeled data, which is scarce. Finally, learning algorithms involve computationally intensive calculations; therefore keeping up with the network stream might require significant computing power.

Although not as adaptable as the learning systems, currently, the signature based approach is a simpler and more practical solution to intrusion detection. However, its major disadvantage is limited detection capability (limited to known attacks). Benchmarking results show that they have high false alarm rates and their detection rate is far from being perfect. To reduce the false alarm rate of these systems, system administrators are required to find the rules that produce false alarms and optimize them for the deployed environment. Frequent signature update is another important issue, which is usually neglected by system administrators. In the next Chapter, we propose and investigate a learning system, which attempts to minimize the amount of a priori information necessary to build the intrusion detection system.

Chapter 3

Methodology

As indicated in introduction, the principle interest of this work is to thoroughly benchmark the performance available from an unsupervised approach to constructing an intrusion detection system on minimal *a priori* information. To this end, a hierarchical SOM architecture is employed, where structural constraints are utilized to build the system. In comparison to previous learning systems, only six of the 41 connection features in KDD 99 dataset are employed (all decision trees in section 2.1 utilize all 41 features). Thus, support for content or temporal information must be derived during the learning process alone. In the following, data collection and summarization matters will be discussed in Section 3.1. The proposed hierarchy of Self Organizing Maps is described in Section 3.2. Pre-processing methods employed are explained in Section 3.3.

3.1 The Dataset

The KDD99 dataset is based on DARPA 98 Intrusion detection dataset, which aims to provide data for researchers working on intrusion detection in general. The DARPA 98 dataset contains network data to configure and evaluate intrusion detection systems. This

recorded network data contains both attacks and normal connections. This raw network data is processed by Columbia University for utilization in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition using Bro network analyzer [41].

3.1.1 Collected Data: DARPA 98 Dataset

The approach accepted for the DARPA 98 dataset is to synthesize both normal data and attacks on an isolated environment. Other approaches involve use of real network data and are rejected because of their drawbacks [37]. In the DARPA approach, a fictitious military network consisting of hundreds of workstations and thousands of users, is simulated to generate non-sensitive network traffic.




Figure 3.1: Simplified version of DARPA 98 Simulation Network

The simulated network shown in Figure 3.1 contains victim machines, other workstations creating background traffic and attackers. Military network is separated from the outside with a router. Normal traffic is generated so that it will be similar to normal usage in a real military network. To achieve this, normal usage statistics, which were derived from a real military base network, are used on the simulation environment. Attacks, which target 3 victim machines, are deployed from outside hosts. Half of the attacks are selected from

clear attacks such as brute force denial of services and the other attacks are stealth attacks such as information espionage. A sniffer, which can see all network traffic is deployed to record all inbound traffic. In addition audit data is collected from various insider hosts, which constitute host-based data. Network based and host based information listed below is made public [16]:

- Recorded network traffic in Tcpdump format
- Sun Basic Security Module audit data
- Unix file system dumps
- Unix process status dumps (1 minute interval captures)

Attacks can manifest themselves on one or more of the data sources listed above. For instance an attack involving malicious URL requests is likely to be manifested on audit data in the form of segmentation fault logs whereas a network attack involving malicious fragmentation can easily be detected in network data.

3.1.2 Summarized Data: KDD 99 Dataset

In 1999, recorded network traffic in the DARPA 98 dataset is processed into TCP connections to form the intrusion detection dataset in KDD99 competition. Specifically "A connection is a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined times, between which data flows from a source IP address to a target IP address under some well defined protocol." [17] Each connection is labeled as normal or one type of attack. Attacks fell into 4 categories, which are as follows [16]:

- *Denial of Service*: Attacker tries to prevent legitimate users from using a service.
- *Remote to Local*: Attacker does not have an account on the victim machine, hence tries to gain local access.

- *User to Root*: Attacker has local access to the victim machine and tries to gain super-user privileges.
- *Probe*: Attacker tries to gather information on the target host.

In this dataset, 41 features are derived to summarize the connection information. 9 of those are "basic features" and the remaining 32 "additional features" fell into 3 different categories.

Basic Features

Basic features can be derived from packet headers without inspecting the content of the packet. Bro [41] is used as the network analyzer to derive basic features. 9 resulting basic features are:

- Duration of the connection
- Protocol type such as TCP, UDP or ICMP;
- Service type such as FTP, HTTP, Telnet;
- A Status flag, which summarizes the connection;
- Total bytes sent to destination host;
- Total bytes sent to source host;
- Whether the destination and source addresses are the same or not;
- Number of wrong fragments
- Number of urgent packets.

Note that protocol and service types are not derived i.e. they are estimated immediately as opposed to after a connection has completed. Moreover status flag, which is considered to

be the summary of the connection [42], is assigned by Bro and should not be confused with TCP/IP suite flags. The last three features are related with specific attack types, hence only the first six basic features are used in this work.

Additional Features

As described in [34], the additional features derived for KDD 99 dataset are as follows:

Content features: Domain knowledge is used to assess the payload of TCP packets. Examples of content-based features are the number of unsuccessful logins and whether root access is gained or not.

Time based features: Because of the temporal nature of network attacks, it is important to inspect the packets within some interval. These features are designed to capture properties that mature over a 2 second temporal window. Number of connections to the same host is an example of time-based features.

Host based features: Utilize a historical window estimated over the number of connections - in this case 100- instead of time. Host based features are therefore used to assess attacks which span over intervals longer than 2 seconds.

As indicated previously, none of the additional features are used in this work.

3.2 Multi Level Hierarchy

A hierarchical SOM architecture similar to [36] is employed in this work. The basic motivation is to steadily build more abstract features as the number of SOM layers increase. That is to say the hypothesis in this work is that features learnt at the initial level of a hierarchy may still be interpreted in terms of recognizable basic measured properties, whereas features at the highest level in the architecture will capture aspects synonymous with normal or attack behaviors. Specifically, three levels are employed, Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: Multi Layer SOM-Architecture

In the first level, individual SOMs are associated with each of the six basic TCP features. This provides a concise summary of the representative patterns of each basic feature, as derived over a suitable temporal horizon. Such a horizon provides the basis for recognizing the "evolution" of an attack over a sequence of connections. The second layer integrates the feature specific views provided by the first level SOMs into a single view of the problem. At this point, we use the training set labels associated with each pattern to label the respective best matching unit in the second layer. The third and final layer is built for those neurons, which win for both attack and normal behaviors. This results in third layer SOMs being associated with specific neurons in the second layer. Moreover, the hierarchical nature of the architecture means that the first layer may be trained in parallel and the third layer SOMs are only trained over a small fraction of the data set.

3.3 Pre-Processing and Clustering

Before all levels, pre-processing stage takes place, which prepares the input data for the next level SOMs. Each pre-processing stage is explained as follows:

3.3.1 1st Level Pre-Processing

In order to build the hierarchical SOM architecture, several data normalization operations are necessary, where these are for the purposes of preprocessing and inter-layer 'quantization' of maps. On this level, preprocessing has two basic functions: to provide a suitable representation for the initial data and support the representation of time. In the case of initial data representation, three of the basic features - Protocol type, Service type and Status flag - are alphanumeric. As the first SOM layer treats each feature independently, we merely map each instance of an alphanumeric character to sequential integer values. Alphanumeric characters and their corresponding numeric values are listed in Appendix A, Table A.2, A.3 and A.4. Numerical features - connection duration, total bytes set to

destination / source host - are used unchanged.




Figure 3.3: Shift register with taps shown in white cells and intervals shown in gray cells

In the case of representing time, the standard SOM used here has no capacity to recall histories of patterns directly. However, sequence as opposed to time stamp, is the property of significance in this work [36]. A shift register, Figure 3.3, of length l is therefore employed in which a 'tap' is taken at a predetermined repeating interval t such that $l \bmod t = 0$, where $\bmod$ is the modulus operator. The first level SOMs only receive values from the shift register that correspond to tap locations. Tap 1 - the most recent tap - holds the current connection value. As each new connection is encountered (enters at the right), the content of each shift register location is transferred one location (to the left), with the previous item in the l th location being lost. As each new connection is added to shift registers, a p dimensional pattern is formed from the taps where pattern dimension p can be expressed in terms of the register length l and tap interval t as in equation (3.1).

$$p = \frac{l - 1}{t + 1} + 1 \quad (3.1)$$

In our experiments, $p = 20$ taps are taken from the shift register of size $l = 96$ with tap interval $t = 4$. The values taken from the tap locations constitute the first level input, therefore the dimension of the first level datasets is 20.

3.3.2 2nd Level Pre-Processing

The motivation of the second level SOM is to integrate or quantize the outputs of 6 first level SOMs, which discover the patterns of each feature individually. On the second level, each connection is characterized by its distance to the first level neurons. There is therefore the potential for each neuron in the second layer SOM to have an input dimension defined by the total neuron count across all first layer SOM networks. This would be a brute force solution that does not scale computationally (there are half a million training set patterns and 216 first level neurons). Moreover, given the topological ordering provided by the SOM, neighboring neurons will respond to similar stimuli. We therefore quantize the topology of each first layer SOM in terms of a fixed number of neurons and re-express the first layer best matching units in terms of these. This significantly reduces the dimension seen by neurons in the second layer SOM.

3.3.3 3rd Level Pre-Processing

As mentioned in Section 3.2, normal or attack labels are associated with the neurons of the second level SOM by using the labels in the training set. This means each neuron on the second level SOM will act as a sensor of a class (attack or normal). However as the network behavior changes over time, neurons associated with attack behavior may start to win for new normal connections. Similarly, network administrators may realize that some neurons, which are associated with normal behavior, win for some attacks and therefore those attacks may end up being undetected by the SOM hierarchy. To solve such problems without re-training, a third level SOM is built for the uncertain second level neurons that wins for both attack and normal behavior. The motivation of the third level SOMs is to separate normal behavior from attacks by utilizing a larger SOM and reducing the size of the training data. To this end, the subset of the second level training set, which wins for the uncertain second level neuron, is extracted and the third level SOM for that neuron is trained with the extracted instances. Therefore no pre-processing is applied except filtering

the second level dataset according to specific second level neurons that tend to win for both attack and normal connections. Labels are associated with the third level map neurons as the same way labels are associated with the second level map neurons (Section 3.2). When a connection wins for an uncertain neuron on the second level, it is sent to the corresponding third level SOM for detection process. The approach for building a third level SOM can be repeated to build higher-level hierarchies, if necessary.

Chapter 4

Learning Algorithms

Two learning algorithms are used to build the hierarchical SOM architecture. Self Organizing Map [40] is the main learning algorithm of the hierarchy. In Section 4.1, the basic SOM algorithm is explained with a simple example dataset, which also explains the use of visualization features. The second learning algorithm is the Potential Function algorithm [38] that is used to quantize the number of SOM neurons 'perceived' by the second layer. The potential Function algorithm is explained in Section 4.2.

4.1 Self-Organizing Maps

Self-Organizing Map (SOM) is an unsupervised learning algorithm developed by Teuvo Kohonen [40]. In this neural network algorithm, neurons are arranged in a 2 dimensional grid, which is also called the output space. The learning process is competitive which means there is a competition among neurons to represent the input patterns. A SOM places similar patterns to contiguous locations in output space and provides projection and visualization options for high dimensional data. The main focus of the SOM is to summarize information while preserving topological relationships.

The training algorithm can be summarized in four basic steps. Step 1 initializes the SOM before training. Best matching unit (BMU) is the neuron, which resembles the input pattern most. On Step 2, best matching unit is determined. Step 3 involves adjusting best matching neuron (or unit) and its neighbors so that the region surrounding the best matching unit will represent the input pattern better. This training process continues until all input vectors are processed. Convergence criterion utilized here is in terms of *epochs*, which defines how many times all input vectors should be fed to the SOM for training. Details of the SOM algorithm are as follows:

Step 1: Initialize each neuron weight $w_i = [w_{i1}, w_{i2}, \dots, w_{ij}]^T \in \mathbb{R}^j$. In this work, neuron weights are initialized with random numbers. Another initialization technique is to draw random samples from input dataset and use them instead of random numbers but it is not used in this work.

Step 2: Present an input pattern $x = [x_1, x_2, \dots, x_j]^T \in \mathbb{R}^j$. In this case, input pattern is a series of taps taken from the shift register. Calculate the distance between pattern x , and each neuron weight w_i , and therefore identify the winning neuron or best matching unit c such as

$$\|x - w_c\| = \min_i \{\|x - w_i\|\} \quad (4.1)$$

SOM Toolbox employs Euclidian distance as the distance metric.

Step 3: Adjust the weights of winning neuron c and all neighbor units

$$w_i(t+1) = w_i(t) + h_{ci}(t)[x(t) - w_i(t)] \quad (4.2)$$

where i is the index of the neighbor neuron and t is an integer, the discrete time coordinate. The neighborhood kernel $h_{ci}(t)$ is a function of time and the distance between neighbor neuron i and winning neuron c . $h_{ci}(t)$ defines the region of influence that the input pattern has on the SOM and consists of two parts [23]: the neighborhood function $h(\|\cdot\|, t)$ and the learning rate function $\alpha(t)$, in equation 4.3

$$h_{ci}(t) = h(\|r_c - r_i\|, t)\alpha(t) \quad (4.3)$$

where r is the location of the neuron on two dimensional map grid. In this work we used Gaussian Neighborhood Function. The learning rate function $\alpha(t)$ is a decreasing function of time. The final form of the neighborhood kernel with Gaussian function is

$$h_{ci}(t) = \exp\left(-\frac{\|r_c - r_i\|^2}{2\sigma^2(t)}\right)\alpha(t) \quad (4.4)$$

where $\sigma(t)$ defines the width of the kernel.

Step 4: Repeat steps 2 - 3 until the convergence criterion is satisfied.

In the following chapters, visualization features of SOM Toolbox [35] will be used to analyze the results; therefore a simple 2 dimensional example is provided to explain the details of visualization. This is a special case since the input space has the same dimension with the output space. Hence, it is possible to visualize the neurons taking the shape of input data. Figure 4.1a shows the 6 by 6 arrangement of the neurons (represented as dots) in 2 dimensional grid with connection between neighbor neurons colored in gray. Figure 4.1b shows the 6 by 6 arrangement of the neurons represented as hexagons. In the following chapters, neurons will be identified with their index; therefore neuron index are shown in Figure 4.1b.

The hand-crafted example input data consists of two clusters, one is distributed between 0 and 30 in both x and y axis (lower cluster) and the other is distributed between 70 and 100 in x and y axis (higher cluster). The input data is plotted in Figure 4.2.a as plus signs. As indicated before, on step 1, neuron weights are initialized with random values, also shown in Figure 4.2a. After training, neurons tend to gather around each cluster trying to model the input data, Figure 4.2b. Although the map stretches to take the shape of two clusters, some neurons are positioned between two clusters, and are distant from the other neurons.

Intrusion data used in this work is high dimensional, therefore it is not possible to use visualization options summarized in Figure 4.2. To visualize the cluster structure of high dimensional weight vectors, a graphic display called U-Matrix [2] is used. In U-Matrix visualization, shades of gray are used to show the distances between weight vectors of the neurons. If the distance between two neurons is small then it is shown with light shades




Figure 4.1: SOM in output space




Figure 4.2: SOM before and after training in input space

whereas if the distance is large, dark shade is used. U-Matrix representation employs extra hexagons between neurons to show the topology of the clusters. U-Matrix of the example SOM is shown in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.3: U-Matrix of the Example SOM

By looking at the U-Matrix in Figure 4.3, it is possible to say that there are two dense regions (i.e. clusters), which are represented as the light shaded regions on the lower left side and on the upper right side. The dark region shows the boundary of the clusters (where the distance between the neurons is maximum). This area corresponds to the outstanding neurons between clusters in Figure 4.2b.

We can use input dataset again to see which cluster corresponds to which area on SOM. To do so, each cluster is individually fed to the SOM again to find the best matching units for each input pattern (2 dimensional points). A count is kept for the number of patterns each best matching unit receives. This count is also called as hit count. These counts are then projected to the 6x6 map grid. This visualization technique is called hit histogram. The hit histogram of the example SOM is shown in Figure 4.4. In hit histograms, proportionally larger counts result a greater area of the hexagon being colored.




Figure 4.4: Hit histogram for the example SOM

The hit histogram in Figure 4.4 demonstrates that the lower cluster (Cluster1) populates the lower left region of the map whereas higher cluster (Cluster 2) populates the upper right region. Hit histograms are very useful to examine which region represents which patterns. At this point, SOM can be labeled by using the hit count information. Labeling process is as follows: for each neuron hit count is kept for each cluster. If, for each neuron, the hit count of Cluster 1 is greater than the hit count of Cluster 2, then the neuron is labeled as Cluster 1. Similarly if, the hit count of Cluster 2 is greater than the hit count of Cluster 1, then the neuron is labeled as Cluster 2. Neurons, which take counts from neither cluster, are left unlabeled. SOM Labels of the example SOM are shown in Figure 4.5, where lower cluster (Cluster 1) is arbitrarily presented with black and higher cluster (Cluster 2) is arbitrarily presented with white. Unlabeled neurons are presented with gray.

The labeled SOM in Figure 4.5 can now be used as a detector to associate a label for an input pattern. For example if the best matching unit of a new input pattern is a black neuron (Cluster 1), then the new input pattern is associated with Cluster 1. Similarly if the best matching unit of a new pattern is a white neuron (Cluster 2), then the new input pattern is associated with Cluster 2. If the best matching unit is one of the unlabeled (gray) neurons, input pattern is said to be distant from both clusters.




Figure 4.5: Labels of the example SOM

4.2 Potential Function Clustering

As indicated in Section 3.3.2, using all neurons on the first level maps will result in a 216 dimensional dataset in second level. Dimension is an important factor, which affects the training time. Therefore some summarization is necessary between the first and the second levels to reduce dimension. To this end, the potential function method is employed as the clustering algorithm. Advantage of Potential Function is it requires minimum a priori knowledge about the input data. The Potential Function Clustering algorithm consists of four steps [38]:

1. Identify the potential of each data point relative to all other data points. All data points represent candidate cluster centers;
2. Select the data point with largest potential and label as a cluster center;
3. Subtract the potential of the data point identified at step (2) from all other points and remove this point from the list of candidate cluster centers;
4. Repeat on step (2) until the end criterion is satisfied.

In this case, the set of data points correspond to the set of neurons in each first layer SOM, where the weights of each neuron describe a neuron position in terms of the original input space.

Step 1: Characterize neurons in terms of how close they are to the others. A neuron with many local neighbors should have a high potential as expressed by a suitable cost function, or

$$P_t(w(j)) = \sum_{i=1}^M \exp(-\alpha \|w(i) - w(j)\|^2) \quad (4.5)$$

where $w(j)$ is the j th SOM neuron, $P_t(w(j))$ is the "potential" for such neuron at iteration t , where M is the number of data points (in this case SOM neurons), and α is the cluster radii.

Step 2: Identify a candidate cluster center (SOM neuron) by choosing the point with the largest potential $P_t(x^*)$.

Step 3: Remove the influence of the chosen neuron from the remaining (unselected) set of SOM neurons. That is, the remaining neurons have their respective potentials decreased by a factor proportional to the distance from the current cluster center, or

$$P_{t+1}(w(j)) = P_t(w(j)) - P_t(w^*) \exp(-\beta \|w(i) - w(j)\|^2) \quad (4.6)$$

where $t+1$ is the index of the updated potential at iteration t ; w^* is the data point associated with the current cluster center, and β is the cluster radii ($\alpha < \beta$).

The result of step 3 is the labeling of a specific SOM neuron as a cluster center.

Step 4: Iterate the process in conjunction with some suitable stop criterion. In this case, we stop when six cluster centers are identified, where the alpha and beta values are set accordingly. The net effect of this process is therefore that each of the six first layer SOMs are characterized in terms of a corresponding set of 6 cluster centers (SOM neurons), resulting in a total of 36 inputs to the second level SOM. The motivation of finding 6 cluster centers from each six 6x6 first level SOMs is to reduce the second level input data dimension from 216 to 36.

Once the 6 cluster centers are identified for each first level SOM, representing the 'quantized' SOM output, we normalize as follows,

$$y = \frac{1}{1 + \|w - x\|} \quad (4.7)$$

where w is the cluster center and x is the original first layer SOM input. The second layer SOM now receives a vector, y , of the form, $y = [y_{11} \dots, y_{16}, y_{21} \dots y_{ij}]^T$ where i is the SOM index and j is the cluster (neuron) index.

Chapter 5

Results

In all experiments, SOM_PAK, which is the open source C implementation of the SOM algorithm, is used to train SOMs in the hierarchy and SOM Toolbox for Matlab is used to visualize and test the resulting SOMs [35]. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, details of the dataset and training parameters are described. Three major groups of experiments focusing on training set biases, third level maps and individual contribution of 6 basic TCP features are detailed in Section 5.3.

5.1 KDD 99 Dataset

The KDD-99 data consists of several components, Table 5.1. As in the case of the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, only the '10% KDD' data is employed for the purposes of training [17]. This contains 24 attack types and is essentially a more concise version of the 'Whole KDD' dataset. One side effect of this is that it actually contains more examples of attacks than normal connections. Moreover, the attack types are not represented equally, with Denial-of-Service attack types - by the very nature of the attack type - accounting for the majority of the attack instances. The

so-called 'Corrected (Test)' dataset provides a dataset with a significantly different statistical distribution than either '10% KDD' or 'Whole KDD (Test)' and contains an additional 14 (unseen) attacks. Characteristics of the three datasets were examined in Appendix A in terms of label counts.

Dataset Label	dos	probe	u2r	r2l	Total Attack	Total Normal
10% KDD	391458	4107	52	1126	396743	97277
Corrected (Test)	229853	4166	70	16347	250436	60593
Whole KDD (Test)	3883370	41102	52	1126	3925650	972780

Table 5.1: Basic Characteristics of the KDD dataset

5.2 Training Parameters

Learning parameters for the SOMs, which are explained in Section 4.1, are summarized in Table 5.2, where this process is repeated for each SOM comprising the hierarchy. In each case, training is completed in two stages, the first providing for the general organization of the SOM and the second for the fine-tuning of neurons. Table 5.3 summarizes the additional parameters utilized by the shift register. The resulting SOM hierarchy consists of 6 SOM networks in the first layer (temporal encoding), each consisting of 6x6 grid and 20 inputs. Potential Function clustering 'quantizes' each original first layer SOM to six neurons using the process described in Section 4.2, resulting in 36 inputs to the second layer SOM (responsible for integration). Once training of the second layer is complete, labeling takes place. That is, for each connection in the training set, the corresponding label is given to the best matching unit in the second layer. A count is kept for the number of normal and attack connections each best matching unit receives. Neurons are labeled as attack (normal), if it receives more attacks (normal connections) than normal connections (attacks). If a neuron receives no counts from attack and normal connections, then it is left unlabeled. Moreover if a neuron receives similar counts from attack and normal connections, then a third level map is built for that neuron.

Parameter	Rough Training	Fine Tuning
Initial α	0.5	0.05
α decay scheme	inverse_t	
Epoch Limit	4,000	
Neighborhood Parameters		
Initial Size	2	1
Function	Gaussian	
Relation	Hexagonal	

Table 5.2: SOM Training Parameters

Shift Register	
Length (l)	96
Number of Taps (p)	20
Tap Interval (t)	4

Table 5.3: Shift Register Parameters

5.3 Experiments

Performance of the classifier is evaluated in terms of the false positive and detection rates, estimated as follows,

$$Skipped\ Rate = \frac{Number\ of\ Skipped\ Connections}{Total\ Number\ of\ Connections} \quad (5.1)$$

$$False\ Positive\ Rate = \frac{Number\ of\ False\ Positives}{Total\ number\ of\ Normal\ Connections} \quad (5.2)$$

$$Detection\ Rate = 1 - \frac{Number\ of\ False\ Negatives}{Total\ number\ of\ Attack\ Connections} \quad (5.3)$$

where false positive rate is the number of normal connections labeled as attack and false negative rate is the number of attack connections labeled as normal. A connection is 'skipped' if its best matching unit does not have a label. Details of the evaluation results based on the three different experiments are given in the following sections.

5.3.1 Experiments on Training Set Biases

The proposed hierarchical SOM architecture was designed to use minimum *a priori* information which means we try to avoid any information that is derived by expert knowledge. In KDD 99 dataset, additional features that we did not use were derived by applying expert knowledge on basic features which were explained in 3.1.2. Using minimum *a priori* information also means that the composition of the training set can have significant implications on the quality of the detector. In this group of experiments, three different approaches involving three different dataset partitions are employed for training (Table 5.4). Table 5.5 summarizes the parameters utilized by the potential function for the three dataset partitions employed.

Dataset label	Total Attack	Total Normal
10% KDD	396,744	97,277
10% KDD (Normal only)	0	97,277
50/50 Normal/Attack	97,277	97,277

Table 5.4: Basic Characteristics of the three training datasets Employed

Potential Function Parameters (For each feature respectively)		
10% KDD	α	$1 \times 10^{-6}, 1 \times 10^{-3}, 2 \times 10^{-7}, 1 \times 10^{-6}, 16 \times 10^{-7}, 0.1599015$
	β	$2 \times 10^{-2}, 2 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-2}, 4 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-1}, 1 \times 10^{-2}$
10%KDD (Normal)	α	$5 \times 10^{-7}, 1 \times 10^{-5}, 1 \times 10^{-5}, 1 \times 10^{-5}, 33 \times 10^{-7}, 6 \times 10^{-7}$
	β	$9 \times 10^{-1}, 13 \times 10^{-2}, 7 \times 10^{-2}, 13 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-2}$
50/50	α	$9 \times 10^{-6}, 1 \times 10^{-5}, 1 \times 10^{-7}, 1 \times 10^{-5}, 175 \times 10^{-7}, 7 \times 10^{-7}$
	β	$2 \times 10^{-1}, 15 \times 10^{-2}, 7 \times 10^{-2}, 13 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-2}, 1 \times 10^{-2}$

Table 5.5: Potential Function Parameters

In the first approach, 10% KDD dataset is used as it is. The resulting system trained with 10% KDD dataset is a misuse detection system, which is trained on both normal behavior and attacks. In the second, only the normal connections in 10% KDD dataset are used to train the maps; such a system is denoted an anomaly detection system. In the last approach, a dataset composed from an equal number of normal and attack connections derived from the 10% KDD dataset is used. As indicated before, KDD datasets contain more attacks than

normal connections. In the last system, the objective is to balance the influence of attacks and normal connections in the training phase. Figures C.1, C.2 and C.3 in Appendix C show the U-Matrix visualizations of the resulting second level SOMs.

System 1: Training with 10% KDD

The hit histogram in Figure 5.1 summarizes the count of attack and normal connections in the second level SOM for 10% KDD.




Figure 5.1: Hit histogram of the second level map for the 10% KDD dataset

It is in apparent in Figure 5.1 that nodes 1, 32 and 36 account for most of the attack connections and neuron 19 most of the normal connections. From Figure 5.1, it is also apparent that several neurons also respond to both normal and attack connections. To this end, neurons 4, 17, 18, 23, 30 and 36 are selected for association with third level SOMs, which will be detailed in Section 5.3.2. A label is associated with each second level neuron according to the number of attack and normal connections for which the neuron wins. Figure 5.2 shows the neuron labels with 'attack' label colored in black, 'normal' colored in white and unlabeled neurons labeled in grayscale. Table 5.6, details the performance of the second level map on 'corrected' test set.

System 2: Training with Only Normal Connections of 10% KDD

An implication of training on 'normal' connections alone is that no information is available to build third level maps. However, once the first and second levels maps are trained on




Figure 5.2: Neurons Labels of the Second Level Map trained on 10%KDD dataset

	Corrected (Test)		
Network level	Skipped	FP rate	Detection rate
Level 2	0%	7.60%	90.60%

Table 5.6: Test Set Results for the first training data set

this data set, the second level map is labeled using the entire 10% KDD dataset. Figure 5.3 shows the hit histogram of the second level map.




Figure 5.3: Hit histogram of the second level map for the normal only 10% KDD dataset

Neurons 1, 5, 16, 18, 35 and 36 account for most of the normal connections although some of them (16 and 36) are also excited by attack connections. Neurons 16, 18 and 36 account for attacks. Moreover, 21 neurons account for normal connections only whereas the remaining 12 neurons do not account for any connection. Figure 5.4 summarizes the associated labels.




Figure 5.4: Neurons Labels of the Second Level Map trained on normal only 10%KDD dataset

Table 5.7 details the test set performance for the case of the two-layer hierarchy on the 'Corrected (Test)' set.

Network level	Corrected (Test)		
	Skipped	FP rate	Detection rate
Level 2	0%	14.50%	91.50%

Table 5.7: Test Set Results for the Second training data set

On comparing performance of systems 1 and 2 (attack dominant versus no attack), detection rates are essentially unchanged, however, the FP rate is approximately 7% better in system 1. An FP rate of 14.5% is not acceptable for an intrusion detection system in practice, hence we did not pursue any further experimentation using a training set consisting of normal connections only.

System 3: Training with 10% KDD Modified - 50% Attack 50% Normal Connections

As indicated in Section 5.1, the 10% KDD training dataset contains more attacks than normal traffic. In this last case, the training set is balanced by using all the 97,277 normal connections, and the first 97,277 attack connections from the 10% KDD. Figure 5.5 shows the hit histogram of the map for this data set (hereafter called 50/50 dataset) at the second level. Seen attacks in Figure 5.5 correspond to the attack instances included in the training set whereas the unseen attacks correspond to the remaining attack instances in 10% KDD.




Figure 5.5: Hit histogram of the second level map for the 50/50 dataset

In this case neurons 1, 6, 14, 22, 27, 31 and 32 account for most of the attack connections, whereas 6 neurons does not account for any connection and the remaining neurons account for normal connections of the data set (Figure 5.6).

Although there seems to be a vague separation between attack and normal connections on the map - neurons at the upper part of the map account for attacks and neurons at the lower end of the map account for normal - the FP rate is still very high, Table 5.8. Thus, compared with the results for System 1 - Table 5.6 - balancing the dataset did not improve on the performance of the attack-based dataset. Thus, no further experiments are performed using 50/50 dataset. Table 5.9 details the performance results for the three systems discussed. All three systems perform well on determining denial of service (dos) attacks and normal behavior. However performance of user to root (u2r) and remote to local (r2l) are low. Most of the u2r and r2l type attacks are content based which means intrusion is manifested in the




Figure 5.6: Neurons Labels of the Second Level Map for the 50/50 dataset

Corrected (Test)			
Network level	Skipped	FP rate	Detection rate
Level 2	0%	14.30%	91.30%

Table 5.8: Test Set Results for the third training data set

packet payload. In this work, packet payload is not inspected. Therefore low performance on u2l and r2l is expected. As indicated before, test (corrected) set contains additional 14 new attacks, which SOMs did not see on training. Performance on this unseen attacks, Table 5.10, also shows SOMs ability to detect novel attacks. Performance of the resulting three systems for each attack type is also detailed in Table B.1, Appendix B.

	normal %	dos %	probe %	u2r %	r2l %
System 1	92.4	96.5	72.8	22.9	11.3
System 2	85.5	96.5	91	22.9	20.5
System 3	85.7	96.7	79.7	30	18.4

Table 5.9: Performance of the three systems on different categories

5.3.2 Experiments on Third Layer Maps

The above experiments with three different partitions of the original KDD training data show that maps trained on normal only or 50/50 datasets are not as promising as the map trained on the unchanged 10% KDD dataset. Therefore for third level experiments, the first system in Section 5.3.1 is selected as the base system. Third layer SOMs are built for the second layer SOM neurons that demonstrate significant counts for both attack and normal connections. Therefore neurons 4, 17, 18, 23, 30 and 36 from the second level map are selected for association with the third level SOMs, one for each second level neuron, where Table 5.11 details the respective attack and normal counts.

As a result, there are 6 third layer SOMs built on top of specific second layer neurons. In each case, third layer SOMs consist of 20x20 neurons, where a larger neuron count is utilized in the third layer in order to increase the likelihood of separation between the two connection types. Moreover, only connections, for which the corresponding second layer neuron is the best matching unit, are used to train the third layer SOMs, facilitating the use of larger SOMs without experiencing a high computational overhead. Finally, in each case,

Attack Name	System 1 %	System 2 %	System 3 %
apache2.	90.3	29.2	96
httptunnel.	58.9	88.6	71.5
Mailbomb.	7.8	8	8
mscan.	90.2	92.3	91.7
named.	23.5	41.2	35.3
processtable.	59.4	77.2	71.9
ps.	0	0	6.3
saint.	79.1	97.4	89.1
Sendmail.	5.9	29.4	11.8
snmpgetattack.	11.5	23	20.1
Udpstorm.	0	0	0
xlock.	0	11.1	11.1
xsnoop.	0	0	0
xterm.	23.1	30.8	38.5

Table 5.10: Detection rate of new attacks for three systems

the inputs to the third level SOMs correspond to the 36-element vector of 'quantized' first layer outputs (hence dataset instances from the second level dataset).

Third level map for second level neuron 36 is the map on which separation of attack and normal connections is most clearly observed. Figure 5.7 shows the U-matrix of this case, whereas the hit histogram is shown in Figure 5.8.




Figure 5.7: U-Matrix of the neuron 36 third level map

It is now clear that the normal connections all reside in the top left corner of the map, whereas the attack connections populate the remainder, Figure 5.9. Finally, the larger

Neuron	Normal	Attack
4	2,177	2,613
17	2,051	3,151
18	1,731	1,706
23	2,304	3,204
30	2,453	5,292
36	1,688	45,440

Table 5.11: Count of Attack and Normal connections per 2nd layer candidate neuron

SOMs utilized in the third layer could result in neurons that remain unlabeled. These are listed as 'skipped' in the analysis of test set performance.

U-Matrix of the neuron 4 map is shown in Figure 5.10. In the case of neuron 4, normal




Figure 5.8: Hit histogram of the neuron 36 third level map




Figure 5.9: Neuron Labels of the neuron 36 third level map

connections populate the entire map whereas attacks populate specific regions, Figure 5.11.




Figure 5.10: U-Matrix of the neuron 4 third level map




Figure 5.11: Hit histogram of the neuron 4 third level map

Most of the neurons are associated as normal connections while attack regions shown in Figure 5.11 are associated with attacks, Figure 5.12.




Figure 5.12: Neuron Labels of the neuron 4 third level map

In the case of the third level map for neuron 17, whose U-Matrix is shown in Figure 5.13, no clear separation occurs between attacks and normal connections. However Figure 5.14 shows that regions that are more populated by attacks are less populated with normal connections and vice versa. Figure 5.15 shows the labels for this map.




Figure 5.13: U-Matrix of the neuron 17 third level map




Figure 5.14: Hit histogram of the neuron 17 third level map




Figure 5.15: Neuron Labels of the neuron 17 third level map

U-Matrix of the neuron 18 map in Figure 5.16 shows that there is a V shaped sparse region on the map. Figure 5.17 shows that this sparse region is unpopulated and unlabeled, Figure 5.18.




Figure 5.16: U-Matrix of the neuron 18 third level map




Figure 5.17: Hit histogram of the neuron 18 third level map




Figure 5.18: Neuron Labels of the neuron 18 third level map

In neuron 23 map, whose U-matrix is shown in Figure 5.19, both normal and attack connections are spread over entire map. Hit histogram is shown in Figure 5.20. Labels of neuron 23 map are shown in Figure 5.21.




Figure 5.19: U-Matrix of the neuron 23 third level map




Figure 5.20: Hit histogram of the neuron 23 third level map




Figure 5.21: Neuron Labels of the neuron 23 third level map

U-Matrix of neuron 30 is shown in Figure 5.22. In the case of neuron 30 map, attacks gather around the lower part of the map, Figure 5.24, whereas normal connections populate the remaining areas, Figure 5.23. Many neurons are unlabeled.




Figure 5.22: U-Matrix of the neuron 30 third level map




Figure 5.23: Hit histogram of the neuron 30 third level map

Table 5.12 details test set performance for the case of two-layer and three-layer hierarchy on the 'Corrected (Test)' KDD test set and finally for the case of the three-layer hierarchy




Figure 5.24: Neuron Labels of the neuron 30 third level map

Corrected (Test)			
Network level	Skipped	FP rate	Detection rate
Level 2	0%	7.60%	90.60%
Level 3	0.70%	4.60%	89%
Whole KDD			
Level 3	0.06%	1.70%	99.70%

Table 5.12: Test Set Results of second and third level hierarchies

on the 'whole KDD' test set. Performance of the two-layer and three-layer hierarchy for each attack type is detailed in Table B.1, Appendix B. The above results of the three layer system is also summarized in [15].

Employing third level maps decreased false positive rate by 3% at the expense of decreasing detection rate by only 1.6%. Larger SOMs utilized in the third layer result in neurons that remain unlabeled. These are listed as 'skipped' in the test set performance in Table 5.12. Performance of the two-layer and three-layer hierarchy on corrected test set for different categories is given in Table 5.13. Performance on new attacks in corrected test set is

detailed in Table 5.14.

	normal	Dos	Probe	u2r	r2l
Level 2	92.4	96.5	72.8	22.9	11.3
Level 3	95.4	95.1	64.3	10	9.9

Table 5.13: Performance of two layer and three layer hierarchies on different categories

Attack Name	Level 2	Level 3
apache2.	90.3	90.7
httptunnel.	58.9	20.9
mailbomb.	7.8	6.8
mscan.	90.2	60.9
named.	23.5	0
processtable.	59.4	47.6
ps.	0	0
saint.	79.1	78.7
sendmail.	5.9	11.8
snmpgetattack.	11.5	10.3
udpstorm.	0	0
xlock.	0	0
xsnoop.	0	0
xterm.	23.1	30.8

Table 5.14: Detection rate of new attacks for two-layer and three-layer hierarchy

5.3.3 Experiments on Feature Contribution

As indicated before, basic TCP features in the KDD 99 dataset are derived from the recorded network traffic by using a network analyzer called Bro. Six basic features employed for our experiments were duration, protocol, service, flag, source bytes and destination bytes. These six features are of different types with different variances. For instance, while Protocol Type feature takes 3 discrete values in KDD99 dataset, some values such as total bytes sent can take values within a large interval. Although the six basic features are not expected to contribute equally, if one feature contributes overwhelmingly more than others, there is a danger that normal or attack behavior is associated with that feature. For instance

if the second level map associates all UDP connections with attacks, it might lead to high false positive rates in future unseen datasets. Thus, it is desirable to have some measure on contribution of individual features.

In the pervious experiments, all six basic TCP features contribute to the input vector of the second level map form 36 dimensional input vectors. In this experiment, the system trained with 10 % KDD dataset in section 5.3.1 (system 1) is used as a baseline system. To find the contribution of each feature in intrusion detection process, the influence of each feature is removed one at a time from the second level map. This is achieved by blocking the corresponding 6 inputs from the feature SOM to the second level SOM. As a result of this, a 30 dimensional feature space exists at the input to the second layer. Six new second level maps are trained with the new 30 dimensional 10% KDD training sets, each excluding one of the six features. 'Corrected' test data set is also prepared with the same approach. U-Matrix and label visualizations of the baseline second level SOM and the new second level SOMs excluding one feature are shown in Figures D.1, D.2, D.3, D.4, D.5, D.6 and D.7 in Appendix D.

Table 5.15 details the performance of second level maps excluding one feature. General detection rate varies between 87.1% and 90.6%. In case of the map excluding protocol, false positive rate increases significantly. Therefore protocol seems to be an important feature that contributes to normal connection determination. Performance of maps, which exclude source and destination bytes, is very close. Exclusion of the Service feature results in the worst detection rate among other maps however it minimizes false positive rate as well.

In addition to general false positive and detection rates shown in Table 5.15, individual attack detection rates are calculated. Our purpose is to find significant changes in detection rate as we exclude different features. Generally, excluding one feature results in some drop in performance. In the case of some attacks it is observed that excluding protocol improves the detection rate. Compared to the general detection rate, some individual attack detection rates change significantly as we exclude features. Table B.2 in Appendix B provides the

Excluded Feature	Skipped	FP Rate	Detection Rate
None (Baseline)	0	7.60%	90.60%
Duration	0	2.30%	89%
Protocol	0.01%	44.10%	91.20%
Service	0	0.90%	87.10%
Flag	0	2.80%	88.30%
Source Bytes	0	1.50%	88.30%
Destination Bytes	0	1.40%	88.30%

Table 5.15: Contribution results on Corrected test set

detection rates for each attack type. Performance of the systems excluding one feature for different categories is given in Table 5.16. Performance on new attacks, which are only included in 'Corrected' test data is shown in Table 5.17.

	normal	Dos	probe	u2r	r2l
Baseline (System 1)	92.4	96.5	72.8	22.9	11.3
Duration	97.7	96.2	58.6	4.3	1.8
Protocol	55.9	96.6	50.5	5.7	27.4
Service	99.1	94.3	28.3	0	0.7
Flag	97.2	95.5	35.8	1.4	0.8
Src. Bytes	98.5	95.5	36.1	0	0.9
Dst. Bytes	98.6	95.5	36.1	0	0.8

Table 5.16: Performance of the systems excluding one feature on different categories

Attack Name	Baseline	Duration	Protocol	Service	Flag	Src. Bytes	Dst Bytes
apache2.	90.3	68.8	13.5	13.4	13.4	13.4	13.4
httptunnel.	58.9	14.6	26.6	11.4	12.7	12.7	12.7
mailbomb.	7.8	6.6	0	0	0	0	0
mscan.	90.2	66.6	2.8	0.9	1.3	0.9	0.9
named.	23.5	0	0	0	0	0	0
processtable.	59.4	40.3	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
ps.	0	0	12.5	0	0	0	0
saint.	79.1	73.9	64.7	42.8	53.8	55.4	55.4
sendmail.	5.9	0	5.9	0	0	0	0
snmpgetattack.	11.5	0.9	33.8	0.9	0.9	1.1	1.1
udpstorm.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
xlock.	0	11.1	0	0	0	0	0
xsnoop.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
xterm.	23.1	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5.17: Performance of the systems excluding one feature on new attacks

5.4 Comparisons

Table 5.18 provides a summary of recent results from alternative data mining approaches trained on the KDD-99 dataset and tested using the 'Corrected (Test)' data [42, 12]. The details of these systems have been discussed in Chapter 2. In addition, performance of the the KDD 99 competition winners are given in Table 5.19.

Technique	Detection Rate	FP Rate
Data-Mining [42]	70-90%	2%
Clustering [12]	93%	10%
K-NN [12]	91%	8%
SVM [12]	98%	10%

Table 5.18: Recent Results on the KDD benchmark

	normal	dos	probe	u2r	r2l
KDD 99 Winner [3]	99.5	97.1	83.3	13.2	8.4

Table 5.19: Performance of the KDD 99 winner

Detection rates are very similar to those reported for the SOM hierarchy constructed in our experiments. However, there are actually several additional factors with which these results need to be interpreted. Firstly, all the data mining approaches are based on all 41 features; the SOM hierarchy only utilizes 6. Secondly, the other systems utilized host based information, thus providing an advantage when detecting content based attacks [12]. The SOM hierarchy is a network based IDS, which does not inspect content.

Chapter 6

Conclusions and Future Work

A hierarchical SOM approach to the IDS problem is proposed and demonstrated on the International Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition intrusion detection benchmark [17]. In the proposed three-level hierarchy, each first level map summarizes one feature. Temporal relations are also encoded on the first level. The second level map integrates the summaries from the first level maps. Third level maps are built to optimize performance. Each neuron on second or higher level maps can be considered as a sensor. Specific attention is given to the representation of connection sequence (time) and the hierarchical development of abstractions sufficient to permit direct labeling of SOM nodes with connection type. Other than these two concepts, no additional use of *a priori* information is employed. The proposed system is shown to be capable of learning attack and normal behavior from the training data and make accurate predictions on the test data, which also contains new attacks that the system was not trained on.

To understand the effect of the training data set on the overall performance of the learning system for IDS, three different versions of KDD data set are employed. According to the version of the dataset, two misuse and one anomaly detection systems are trained. Based on our results in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8, using different distributions or percentages of attack to normal connections does not affect the detection rate of the hierarchical SOM

architecture. However, it does have an influence on the false positive rate of the detector. As the nature and ratio of attacks in the training set increase, the false positive rate becomes more acceptable - indeed with a small decrease in the detection rate.

Building third level maps for those second level neurons that receive counts from attack and normal connections demonstrate separation between attacks and normal connections. Although three levels are demonstrated in the hierarchical SOM architecture, more levels can be added to the hierarchy in the same way that the third level is constructed. If this hierarchy is deployed in a real world network, when the network behavior changes, for example due to a new service addition, additional third level maps can be built for second level neurons, which starts to produce false alarms for new services, thus tuning the hierarchy for the new condition without re-training.

To determine the contribution of each of the six basic TCP features, experiments are conducted to assess the influence of each feature by removing the corresponding first level SOM and re-training second level SOMs. Although in all cases there is a fluctuation, experiments on the six basic TCP features demonstrated that contributions of the six basic TCP features to intrusion detection are similar in terms of detection rate (Table 5.15). However, results show that the protocol feature should be included to reduce the false positive rate. Moreover, when the service feature is excluded, hierarchical SOM architecture achieves the lowest false positive rate. In [42], (Bro) flag feature is reported to be most describing pattern because it is the summary of the connection. Results here, however, show that exclusion of the flag feature does not dramatically affect the detection or false positive rates.

In comparison to data mining approaches currently proposed, the approach provides competitive performance whilst utilizing a fraction of the feature set (6 of the 9 "Basic features of an Individual TCP connection" and none of the 32 additional higher-level derived features). At the same time the SOM hierarchy does not make use of host-based or content-based information.

This work addresses design issues of the hierarchical SOM architecture as well as assessing the importance of training set biases and contributions of the individual features. However, there are issues that can be improved such as data collection and summarization issues, future work on distributed intrusion detection approach and optimization of SOM algorithm.

Data collection and summarization are very important in case of data driven systems like the proposed SOM hierarchy. Raw network data of the KDD 99 intrusion detection dataset is collected from the DARPA 98 simulated test environment and then summarized into connection records with Bro network analyzer. Although collecting raw data from a controlled environment and then summarizing the data into high-level events is a valid solution, we also believe that data collection and summarization procedures should be well-defined, thus can be repeated easily. The KDD 99 intrusion detection data is still the only labeled data, which enable intrusion detection designers to train and evaluate their systems on and compare the results with other people who employed the same dataset. Since 1999, many new technologies and protocols have been developed and many new attack types have been devised, therefore this dataset has become outdated. Moreover, intrusion detection designers should be able to demonstrate that their systems will work for datasets other than DARPA 98 or KDD 99 data. Unfortunately, very little is published about the technical and procedural details of the DARPA intrusion detection environments, which makes it very difficult to follow their procedures to repeat the data collection. A new test environment is needed which is well documented and whose methodology is validated [22]. This new system not only should provide up-to-date data for intrusion detection designers but also should allow them to examine results in the light of the complete documentation.

The Bro network analyzer, which is used to create KDD 99 dataset, also has some shortcomings. For the KDD 99 dataset, authors of [42] modified the fragment inspection component of Bro and extended it to handle ICMP connections. "Modified Bro" is the network analyzer proposed as the generic component for building intrusion systems. However "modified Bro" is not publicly available. Our experience with the open source Bro (stable version 0.7) showed that it needs different policy files to analyze different protocols. Only,

TCP and UDP policies are bundled with the open source Bro. Additionally summarization of the connectionless UDP traffic into connection records is an issue open to discussion. We agree that generic and publicly available components should be developed to collect and summarize raw data, which will allow intrusion detection designers to focus on the intrusion detection component itself. However, currently no such tool is available. Designers either choose to utilize KDD 99 dataset, which is outdated, or develop their own customized network summarizers, which in turn makes comparisons with other systems difficult. Therefore a generic network analyzer, which is flexible and easy to integrate to higher intrusion detection components, should be developed.

Distributed intrusion detection is a promising technique, which reduces the amount of monitored data and eliminates boundaries between host based and network based systems. In distributed intrusion detection, lightweight intrusion detection systems (sensors) are deployed on various locations (computers) of the network. Deployed lightweight sensors monitor network and/or host activities without consuming as much resource as a "global" intrusion detection system does. Collected "local" data is then sent to a central system to determine the global state of the network. An example of the distributed intrusion approach [43] is implemented by using Snort [32] as the sensor component. The proposed hierarchical SOM architecture can also be used as the sensor component to develop a distributed intrusion detection system.

In the KDD 99 dataset, some denial of service attacks such as smurf attack involves sending many packets to the target host. As a result, the KDD 99 dataset contains many repeating instances. Training process can be optimized by removing or reducing the repeating instances from the input dataset. However special attention must be given; this might change the distribution of the input data and the resulting system may suffer in terms of detection rate.

Another point of optimization is the detection process. In the current hierarchical SOM, the best matching unit is determined by calculating the distance between the input instance to all second and possibly third layer neurons. In this case, all the neurons in second and

third level maps are used for detection. As indicated in Section 4.1, the SOM places similar patterns with consecutive locations. Therefore, representative neurons can be selected for different neighborhoods, which have the same label. This will reduce the number of distance calculations between the input instance and the neurons, hence detection time.

Appendix A

KDD 99 Dataset Details

Details of the attack definitions can be found at MIT Lincoln Laboratory web site[30].

Table A.1: Label counts of the KDD 99 datasets

Attack	Category	Corrected	10 Percent Kdd	Whole Kdd
apache2.	dos	794	0	0
back.	dos	1098	2203	2203
buffer_overflow.	u2r	22	30	30
ftp_write.	r2l	3	8	8
guess_passwd.	r2l	4367	53	53
httptunnel.	r2l	158	0	0
imap.	r2l	1	12	12
ipsweep.	probe	306	1247	12481
land.	dos	9	21	21
loadmodule.	u2r	2	9	9
mailbomb.	dos	5000	0	0
<i>Continued on next page</i>				

Table A.1: Label counts of the KDD 99 datasets

Attack	Category	Corrected	10 Percent Kdd	Whole Kdd
mscan.	probe	1053	0	0
multihop.	r2l	18	7	7
named.	r2l	17	0	0
neptune.	dos	58001	107201	1072017
nmap.	probe	84	231	2316
normal.	normal	60593	97277	972780
perl.	u2r	2	3	3
phf.	r2l	2	4	4
pod.	dos	87	264	264
portsweep.	probe	354	1040	10413
processtable.	dos	759	0	0
ps.	u2r	16	0	0
rootkit.	u2r	13	10	10
saint.	probe	736	0	0
satan.	probe	1633	1589	15892
sendmail.	r2l	17	0	0
smurf.	dos	164091	280790	2807886
snmpgetattack.	r2l	7741	0	0
snmpguess.	r2l	2406	0	0
spy	r2l	0	2	2
sqlattack.	u2r	2	0	0
teardrop.	dos	12	979	979
udpstorm.	dos	2	0	0
warezclient.	r2l	0	1020	1020
warezmaster.	r2l	1602	20	20
worm.	r2l	2	0	0
<i>Continued on next page</i>				

Table A.1: Label counts of the KDD 99 datasets

Attack	Category	Corrected	10 Percent Kdd	Whole Kdd
xlock.	r2l	9	0	0
xsnoop.	r2l	4	0	0
xterm.	u2r	13	0	0

Table A.2: Enumeration of the alphanumeric Protocol feature

Value	Assigned
0	tcp
1	udp
2	icmp

Table A.3: Enumeration of the alphanumeric Service feature

Value	Assigned
http	0
smtp	1
finger	2
domain u	3
auth	4
telnet	5
ftp	6
eco i	7
ntp u	8
ecr i	9
other	10
private	11
<i>Continued on next page</i>	

Table A.3: Enumeration of the alphanumeric Service feature

Value	Assigned
pop 3	12
ftp data	13
rje	14
time	15
mtp	16
link	17
remote job	18
gopher	19
ssh	20
name	21
whois	22
domain	23
login	24
imap4	25
daytime	26
ctf	27
nntp	28
shell	29
IRC	30
nntp	31
http 443	32
exec	33
printer	34
efs	35
courier	36
uucp	37
<i>Continued on next page</i>	

Table A.3: Enumeration of the alphanumeric Service feature

Value	Assigned
klogin	38
kshell	39
echo	40
discard	41
systat	42
supdup	43
iso tsap	44
hostnames	45
csnet ns	46
pop 2	47
sunrpc	48
uucp path	49
netbios ns	50
netbios ssn	51
netbios dgm	52
sql net	53
vmnet	54
bgp	55
Z39 50	56
ldap	57
netstat	58
urh i	59
X11	60
urp i	61
pm dump	62
tftp u	63
<i>Continued on next page</i>	

Table A.3: Enumeration of the alphanumeric Service feature

Value	Assigned
tim i	64
red i	65

Table A.4: Enumeration of the Bro Flag feature

Value	Assigned
SF	0
S1	1
REJ	2
S2	3
S0	4
S3	5
RSTO	6
RSTR	7
RSTOS0	8
OTH	9
SH	10

Appendix B

Detailed Detection Rates

Table B.1: Detection rates for each attack type for systems explained in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2

Attack	Category	System 1 (Level3)	System 1	System 2	System 3
apache2.	dos	90.68	90.30	29.22	95.97
back.	dos	45.17	50.91	7.19	52.00
buffer_overflow.	u2r	9.09	13.64	18.18	22.73
ftp_write.	r2l	0.00	0.00	0.00	33.33
guess_passwd.	r2l	9.69	7.95	16.69	13.44
httptunnel.	r2l	20.89	58.86	88.61	71.52
imap.	r2l	100.00	0.00	100.00	100.00
ipsweep.	probe	34.64	25.49	83.01	25.16
land.	dos	44.44	100.00	100.00	100.00
loadmodule.	u2r	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
mailbomb.	dos	6.80	7.80	8.00	7.98
mscan.	probe	60.87	90.22	92.31	91.74
<i>Continued on next page</i>					

Table B.1: Detection rates for each attack type for systems explained in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2

Attack	Category	System 1 (Level3)	System 1	System 2	System 3
multihop.	r2l	5.56	0.00	16.67	0.00
named.	r2l	0.00	23.53	41.18	35.29
neptune.	dos	90.89	96.39	97.36	96.93
nmap.	probe	53.57	40.48	95.24	85.71
perl.	u2r	0.00	0.00	0.00	50.00
phf.	r2l	0.00	0.00	50.00	50.00
pod.	dos	24.14	6.90	60.92	4.60
portsweep.	probe	47.74	51.98	93.79	84.75
processtable.	dos	47.56	59.42	77.21	71.94
ps.	u2r	0.00	0.00	0.00	6.25
rootkit.	u2r	7.69	69.23	53.85	61.54
saint.	probe	78.67	79.08	97.42	89.13
satan.	probe	69.63	73.67	88.00	76.61
sendmail.	r2l	11.76	5.88	29.41	11.76
smurf.	dos	99.85	99.85	99.98	99.83
snmpgetattack.	r2l	10.28	11.55	23.05	20.10
snmpguess.	r2l	2.29	3.20	5.49	7.52
sqlattack.	u2r	0.00	50.00	50.00	50.00
teardrop.	dos	0.00	16.67	16.67	25.00
udpstorm.	dos	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
warezmaster.	r2l	19.54	27.34	34.14	34.46
worm.	r2l	0.00	50.00	50.00	50.00
xlock.	r2l	0.00	0.00	11.11	11.11
xsnoop.	r2l	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
xterm.	u2r	30.77	23.08	30.77	38.46

Table B.2: Detection rates for each attack type for feature contribution experiments in Section 5.3.3

Attack	Baseline	Duration	Protocol	Service	Flag	S.Bytes	D.Bytes
rootkit.	69.23	7.69	7.69	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
saint.	79.08	73.91	64.67	42.80	53.80	55.43	55.43
satan.	73.67	69.38	85.49	48.99	63.26	63.26	63.26
sendmail.	5.88	0.00	5.88	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
smurf.	99.85	99.71	99.85	99.78	99.66	99.77	99.77
snmpgetattack.	11.55	0.87	33.77	0.87	0.92	1.11	1.09
snmpguess.	3.20	0.54	59.98	0.91	0.79	0.83	0.83
sqlattack.	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
teardrop.	16.67	0.00	33.33	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
udpstorm.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
warezmaster.	27.34	9.30	7.55	0.25	0.69	0.50	0.50
worm.	50.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
xlock.	0.00	11.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
xsnoop.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
xterm.	23.08	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

Appendix C

U-Matrix Displays of the 2nd Level SOMs in Section 5.3.1




Figure C.1: U-Matrix of the second level map for the 10% KDD dataset




Figure C.2: U-Matrix of the second level map for the normal only 10% KDD dataset




Figure C.3: U-Matrix of the second level map for the 50/50 dataset

Appendix D

U-Matrix and Labels of the 2nd Level SOMs in Section 5.3.3




Figure D.1: U-matrix and labels for the baseline 36 dimensional second level map (System 1)




Figure D.2: U-matrix and labels for the duration excluded second level map




Figure D.3: U-matrix and labels for the protocol excluded second level map




Figure D.4: U-matrix and labels for the service excluded second level map




Figure D.5: U-matrix and labels for the flag excluded second level map




Figure D.6: U-matrix and labels for the source bytes excluded second level map




Figure D.7: U-matrix and labels for the destination bytes excluded second level map

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